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by statute of an absolute privilege; (8) or the enactment of a statute
granting a qualified privilege.
The storm of controversy that the principal case has fomented
has found support for each of these several alternatives. In the tone
of the policy discussion that has arisen around this case, which by
now greatly overshadows -thelegal controversy involved, the writer,
while subscribing to the correctness of the decision itself, would
espouse the enactment of statutes granting the qualified privilege.
L. B. S.
CONSTruTTIONAL LAw-S_,RCH AND S

unE-GIr

OF PMVACY

OF T=E Ho~m.-Petitioner refused to permit a duly authorized

municipal housing inspector to enter and make an inspection of his
home pursuant to a housing standard ordinance of Dayton, Ohio.

The ordinance provided for the inspection of dwellings at any reasonable hour to determine their condition for the purpose of safe-

guarding the health and safety of the occupants of dwellings and
the general public. It also fixed a penalty for refusal to allow inspection. Petitioner was convicted of violating the ordinance and
applied for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that the ordinance
violated both the federal and state constitutional provisions against

unreasonable search and seizure. The court of appeals denied the
writ. Held, on appeal, that the city ordinance was a valid exercise

of police power, and as such was not violative of the Ohio constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. State ex rel.
Eaton v. Price, 151 N.E.2d 528 (Ohio 1958).
The problem presented by the principal case is the conflict
between the privacy of an individual in his home as guaranteed
by constitutional provisions against unreasonable search and seizure
and the police power of the municipality in the regulation of public
health, safety and welfare. The maxim that "every man's home is
his castle" has been fashioned as a part of the constitutional law of
the United States by the fourth amendment and similar provisions
against unreasonable searches and seizures in state constitutions.
"The basic premise of the prohibition against searches was not
protection against self incrimination; itwas the common-law right of
a man to privacy in his home, a right which is one of the indispensable ultimate essentials of our concept of civilization."

Dis-

trict of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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In the principal case the court held that a municipality in the
exercise of its police power could inspect the dwellings of its citizens
without first obtaining a search warrant and that a man's home is
not a "castle" free and above the police power. The reasoning underlying the court's decision is that the ipolice power of a municipality
in regulating the general health and safety of the community overrides the right of a homeowner to the privacy of his home.
Previous decisions have gone so far as to permit municipalities
to inspect private institutions and business premises for health
purposes by holding that statutes authorizing such inspections do
not contravene constitutional provisions against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Reinhart v. State, 193 Tenn. 15, 241 S.W.2d
854 (1951); Sister Felicitas v. Hartridge, 148 Ga. 832, 98 S.E. 588
(1919); Hubbell v. Higgins, 148 Iowa 36, 126 N.W. 914 (1910).
The effect of the court's decision in the principal case is to extend
this proposition to the search of a private home.
As a rule, the search warrant is the only legal means which can
be employed to search the premises of a private individual. Except
in cases of extreme necessity, it is a judicial officer who is to decide
when the right of privacy is to submit to the power to search. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
The precise point raised in the principal case was before the
court in the Little case, supra. In that case the court held that an
inspector of the health department could not enter an individual's
home to make an inspection without a search warrant. The reasoning of the court was that it was unreasonable to invade a private
home to inspect and control unsanitary conditions when there is
adequate time to obtain a search warrant without endangering the
public safety. The Little case, supra, indicated that, except for the
most urgent necessities, a search warrant is required when the
premises to be inspected are private homes and the circumstances
present no immediate danger to the public.
Housing ordinances which set forth regulations for the maintenance of buildings are necessarily concerned with the health and
safety requirements of buildings and these ordinances to be effective
must be supported by adequate police power measures. Richards
v. Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955); State v. Building
Commrn of Trumbull, 135 Conn. 415, 65 A.2d 165 (1948); 25
GEo. WAsnm L. REv. 1 (1956). However, while the police power

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol61/iss3/9

2

H.: Constitutional Law--Search and Seizure--Right of Privacy of the H
226

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

is broad in scope, it is not an unlimited power. It may not transcend
constitutional limitations.
"A reasonable exercise of the police power is one required by
public necessity, and a public necessity is the legitimate exercise
of its power." 6 McQmLLN, MUNICIPAL COPxORATONS § 24.09, 460
(3d ed. 1949).
The court in the principal case, in reaching its decision, relied
on the case of Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 764 (1956),
which held that an ordinance, reciting that inspection was necessary
to combat growth of slum conditions, was not unconstitutional when
the inspections were to be made at reasonable, daylight hours and
were of a routine nature.
However, it would seem that in view of the firmness with which
the right of a man to the privacy of his home has been established,
the better view would be to protect this right in the absence of a
clear necessity for its invasion. As was stated in the Little case,
supra: "If an acute emergency occurs precluding reference to a
court or magistrate, public officials must take such steps as are necessary to protect the public. But, absent such emergency, health laws
are enforced by the police power and are subject to the same constitutional limitations as are other police powers. It is wholly fallacious to say that any particular police power is immune from
constitutional restrictions." At 16. Thus, in balancing the power
of a municipality to protect the health, safety and welfare of its
citizens against the individual's right to the privacy of his home, the
test of reasonableness now appears to be the deciding factor. It is
submitted that considerations of health, safety and welfare of the
community may require that a municipality be permitted to exercise
the police power to its fullest extent. On the other hand, the privacy of the home has long been considered a most sacred right, one
not to be hastily surrendered or chipped or frittered or worn away
by the edgencies of the times. COOLEY, CoNs'rrrunoNAL LnvimrrATIONS 73 (8th ed. 1927).
A. G. H.

MuNiCIPAL CORPORATIONS-TAXATION-VALDrTY

OF LICENSE AND

USE TAxES ON PtBuc Unxxrr.-Upon expiration of P's public utility
franchise for telephone services in a municipality, the utility continued to use and occupy the city streets for its telephone facilities
and equipment. Five of P's employees were arrested by the munici-

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1959

3

